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Where the Rubber Meets the Road
Shifting State-Society Relations and Emerging Resource Frontiers 
in China’s Southwest Borderlands
In this article, we examine the modern Chinese state’s efforts to consolidate 
control over land and people in its southwest borderlands via the develop-
ment of rubber plantations. We examine these efforts via the lenses of the 
changes that ensued in the political, economic, and sociocultural life-worlds of 
certain indigenous Akha communities in post-1980s Yunnan, China, in con-
junction with their transition from shifting rice to sedentary rubber cultiva-
tion. This livelihood shift, while initially a largely passive response on the part 
of Akha to the state, was, at later times, more actively driven by Akha as they 
sought to maintain some autonomy from the state. While this particular case 
is a fairly predictable outcome of broader sets of processes occurring in other 
resource frontiers in Asia and beyond, the Akha case is unique in highlighting 
the fact that resource frontiers are complex and dynamic spaces where one 
often encounters a diversity of distinct actors, objects, and practices at play 
that actively affect larger political systems and projects.
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In this article, we examine the modern Chinese state’s efforts to consolidate control over land and people in its southwest borderlands via the development 
and expansion of large-scale rubber plantations. We examine these efforts via the 
lenses of the changes that occurred in the political, economic, and sociocultural 
life-worlds of certain indigenous Akha communities in post-1980s Yunnan, China, 
as they passively and actively responded to these state initiatives, all the while tran-
sitioning from shifting subsistence rice to sedentary cash-crop rubber cultivators.
On the one hand, this particular case is a fairly predictable outcome of broader sets 
of processes occurring in other resource frontiers in Asia and beyond as part of the 
last great state enclosure (Tsing 2005; Scott 2009; Peluso and Lund 2011; Li 2014). 
A key dynamic of these changes is the rapid growth and expansion of boom crops, 
including rubber (Hall, Hirsch, and Li 2011). Jefferson Fox and J. C. Castella predict 
that “by 2050, the area of land (in southwest China and Mainland Southeast Asia) 
dedicated to rubber trees could quadruple, largely replacing lands now occupied by 
evergreen broadleaf trees and swidden-related secondary vegetation” (2013, 155).
On the other hand, our findings reveal that resource frontiers, not unlike bor-
ders as discussed by Harlan Koff (2013, 11), are complex and dynamic spaces where 
one often encounters a diversity of distinct actors, objects, and practices at play 
that actively affect larger political systems and projects. Here we highlight the 
roles of certain Akha actors in shaping and reshaping new and emerging resource 
frontiers in ways that afford them some autonomy from the state while further 
entrapping them in new forms of state-, market-, and climate-driven controls and 
vulnerabilities (Chatterjee 2004; Appadurai 2013; Krupa and Nugent 2015).
As for the impacts of these livelihood transitions on Akha life-worlds, we stress 
that while rubber has introduced unprecedented increases in cash incomes, it has 
done so unevenly and brought about unprecedented levels of socioeconomic strat-
ification. This increased cash income, however, generally improved the living stan-
dards of Akha farmers and helped elevate their social status in greater China. The 
elevated social status of Akha is indicated in a significant increase in the number of 
relatively more dominant ethnic Han and Dai marrying into Akha households in 
rural Xishuangbanna within the last two decades.
These increased cash incomes, however, brought about many new social prob-
lems, such as more conspicuous and competitive displays of consumption and 
feasting, widespread gambling, rising rates of alcoholism and other forms of drug 
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dependencies, rising intergenerational tensions, and prostitution. These changes 
also impacted traditional Akha religio-cultural systems or Ancestral practices in 
expected and unexpected ways.1 Rising cash incomes along with these social prob-
lems all served, on the one hand, to further undermine Akha Ancestral practices 
that were already severely undermined by the state in pre-reform-era China while, 
on the other hand, providing an opportunity for certain Akha communities in 
post-reform-era China to selectively (re)vitalize some of those Ancestral practices, 
in part as a means of promoting their “survival through culture” (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2009, 24).
Background on research methods and primary field site
This article is based primarily on analyses of field data that Jianhua Wang collected 
via long-term intermittent fieldwork, household surveys, and semi-structured 
interviews in the rural, ethnic-Akha rubber-farming village of Arka in Xishuang-
banna, Yunnan, China, between the early 2000s and the present.2 Micah Morton 
has conducted intermittent periods of fieldwork in the same village between 2009 
and the present. In addition, Wang is an indigenous Akha scholar who was born 
and raised in the vicinity of Arka village, while Morton is a foreigner that married 
into another Akha village in the area in 2011.
Arka village is located in Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, which 
lies at the southern tip of Yunnan Province, China, and borders on Myanmar and 
Laos. Xishuangbanna is a predominantly mountainous area with small flat valleys 
and basins that comprise just 5 percent of its total land area. Historically, ethnic 
Dai (Tai Lue) settled in these basins, converting them into irrigated paddy fields, 
while the region’s vast mountainous areas were occupied by other ethnic groups, 
such as the Akha, Lahu, Bulang, Yi, Jinuo, Yao (Mien), and others whose economy 
was mainly based on swidden agriculture.
Traditionally, there were forest buffer zones between the lowland Dai and the 
numerous highlanders surrounding the basins. It was in these very buffer zones 
that the Chinese state first began to establish state rubber farms in the 1950s. Since 
the flat lowlands were comprised of permanent paddy fields, the state’s expansion 
of these early rubber farms was achieved by appropriating large amounts of the 
most cherished fallow lands of swidden fields below 800 meters above sea level.3 
As a result, highland farmers were forced to farm on less desirable lands either at 
higher altitudes or on greater degrees of slope.
Another consequence of the state’s establishment and expansion of rubber 
farms in Xishuangbanna was a major demographic shift in local ethnoscapes. In 
1949, there were only 5,000 Han in Xishuangbanna. From roughly the 1950s 
onward, however, the local Han population progressively soared to 17,905 in 1956, 
185,894 in 1982, and 340,431 in 2010, comprising 6.9 percent, 28.3 percent, and 
30.03 percent of the total population respectively.4 Most of the early Han migrants 
were brought into Xishuangbanna from other parts of China to work on the state 
rubber farms. At present, Han are the largest ethnic group in Xishuangbanna. In 
contrast, the local Dai population, which used to be the majority, is now the sec-
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ond largest ethnic group in the region, comprising 27.89 percent of the total pop-
ulation in 2010. Akha are currently the third largest ethnic group behind the Han 
and Dai, comprising 19 percent of the total population in 2010.
The Akha, a Tibeto-Burman-speaking group, are one of the largest upland 
groups in the Upper Mekong Region, with an estimated population of seven hun-
dred thousand people (Wang, Rongsheng, and Sorchampa 2014).5 Until recently, 
Akha livelihoods in the larger region were based primarily in swidden agriculture, 
especially subsistence rice. Since the 1980s, however, Akha have experienced signif-
icant changes in their livelihoods as a result of the region’s ongoing, albeit uneven 
and contested, transition from battlefields to markets (Li 2013; Morton 2013, 2015; 
Sturgeon 2005, 2010, 2012; Tooker 2004, 2012; Wang 2013). In Xishuangbanna, 
most Akha villagers are now rubber farmers. In addition, since the early 2000s 
some Akha from Xishuangbanna have played key roles in driving the current rub-
ber booms in neighboring Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand from below (Shi 2008; 
Sturgeon 2010).
Histories of rubber in China and Xishuangbanna
The large-scale development of rubber plantations in China first began in the 
1950s when the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC) started to 
promote domestic rubber cultivation in the intertwined interests of national secu-
rity, defense building, and industrial growth (Yunnan Agricultural Reclamation 
Cooperation Ltd. and Yunnan Association of Tropical Crops 2005).6 The state 
focused its efforts to develop self-sufficiency in rubber production in its two largest 
tropical frontiers of Hainan Island and Xishuangbanna, Yunnan, where it estab-
lished numerous state rubber farms in the 1950s.7
In this article, we focus on Xishuangbanna, a mountainous frontier region in far 
southwest China that has long been dominated by non-Han ethnic groups whose 
livelihoods, with the exception of lowland Dai rice cultivators, were largely based 
on upland swidden cultivation until roughly the 1980s. These non-Han ethnic 
groups only recently became “ethnic minorities” in this area as a result of two 
intertwined factors—the heightened direct presence of the central Chinese state 
and the large-scale influx of Han migrants from other parts of China. In this con-
text, state officials saw rubber trees as the perfect crop to consolidate control over 
local natural resources and people.
In order to achieve these grand directives, however, state officials had to trans-
form what was apperceived as the “primitive,” “illegible,” and “unproductive” 
practice of swidden cultivation into the “modern,” “legible,” and “productive” 
practice of sedentary rubber cultivation (Scott 1998; Xu 2006). State officials 
further sought to gradually transform what were apperceived as “backward” and 
“unaccountable” local non-Han ethnics into “modern” and “accountable” labor-
ers of the state. It would take the state nearly half a century to effectively eliminate 
swidden cultivation via numerous top-down policies and initiatives, including an 
outright ban on swidden cultivation in 1998. As a result, many non-Han ethnic 
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farmers in Xishuangbanna were transformed into “modern” rubber-producing 
subjects of the state.
These non-Han farmers, however, were eventually so successful in developing 
private rubber plantations, especially post-1984, that the total area of their holdings 
surpassed that of the state farms in 2004 (Xishuangbanna Statistics Bureau 2004). 
Some of these smallholders, particularly certain ethnic Dai (Tai-Lue) and Akha 
residing along China’s borders with northwest Laos and east Myanmar, have suc-
cessfully outsourced the development of rubber plantations to Laos and Myanmar 
since China joined the World Treaty Organization (WTO) in 2001 (Shi 2008; Stur-
geon 2010). Janet Sturgeon argues that the proliferation of these smallholder rub-
ber plantations within and beyond Xishuangbanna led to the creation of “chaotic 
landscapes” neither expected by states nor under their direct control (2012, 123–25).
Renegotiated rubber frontiers: From state to people plantations
During the period when the state established rubber plantations in Xishuangbanna 
(1950s to early 1960s), most of the farm managers and workers were either trans-
ferred Han soldiers or Han farmers from other parts of China, especially Hunan 
province. Local ethnic minorities were excluded from such work as they were 
deemed “backward” and of “low quality” for more “advanced” kinds of labor such 
as rubber cultivation (Xu 2006; Sturgeon 2010). At the same time, however, the 
state required these ethnic minorities to produce the food necessary to sustain the 
mostly ethnic Han workforce in not only rubber but also steel production.
Eventually, however, the state found that its rubber farms were not able to sup-
ply enough rubber to meet the nation’s rising demand. The state further realized 
that it could not continue to endlessly expand its rubber plantations due to both 
a lack of “advanced” Han labor and also the fact that most of the suitable land 
was being used, albeit from the state’s perspective “underutilized” or “wasted,” by 
“uncivilized” ethnic-minority shifting cultivators. From the vantage of state offi-
cials, the best way to solve these problems was to replace swidden lands with rub-
ber plantations and thereby transform local minorities into rubber farmers. This 
strategy, it was envisioned, would allow the state to not only consolidate control 
over local natural resources and people but to also produce more rubber with no 
direct cost to the state.
As a result, in 1964 the Ministry of Agricultural Reclamation ordered state 
farms in Yunnan to assist local governments in developing min ying xiang jiao or 
“peoples’ rubber plantations.” In the same year, the first collective rubber planta-
tion was established at Jinglan village near Jinghong City. These initial efforts to 
develop and expand “peoples’ rubber plantations,” however, were halted amid the 
turmoil and upheaval of the Great Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Thereafter, 
in 1980, the central government sent another order to continue rubber expan-
sion in Yunnan. The Yunnan Provincial Government responded by requesting that 
state farms either incorporate local villagers and their lands into their operations or 
allocate 6 percent of their total profits to the development of more “peoples’ rub-
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ber plantations,” especially by giving interest-free loans to local farmers to develop 
such plantations (Li 1988).
This new policy promoted the development of two kinds of “peoples’ rubber 
plantations” in Jinghong City that were either collectively or jointly operated. In 
the meantime, many local Akha villagers and their lands were directly incorporated 
into previously established state farms in Mengla County. Collective plantations 
were developed with interest-free loans and technical support from the state farms. 
In actuality, however, while these collective plantations were officially categorized 
as “peoples’ rubber plantations,” they were in fact run by local county or town-
ship-level governments and thus functioned as an extension of the state farms. The 
key difference between these collective plantations and the state farms was that the 
latter were run by higher levels of government at provincial and national levels.
The state farms were further mandated to develop jointly operating (lian ying) 
rubber plantations with local villages. These joint-enterprises involved state farms 
providing rubber tree seedlings and technical support to villagers, with the latter 
providing their land and labor. The profits were then shared by the state farm and 
villagers according to either a 30/70 or 40/60 scheme.
Finally, in 1984 another type of “peoples’ rubber plantation” came into being, 
that of the privately owned rubber plantation. Earlier, in 1982–1983, the state 
began to contract out what was recategorized as “agricultural land” to individual 
households according to the central policy of the Household Contract Responsi-
bility System (HCRS, jiating lianchan chengbao zherenzhi). It was on these lands 
that the earliest “true” private plantations came into being.
State officials perceived these “legible” and “productive” plantations as a much 
more desirable alternative to the “illegible” and “unproductive” swidden lands 
of ethnic minorities (Huang et al. 2005; Xu 2006). As in the case of jointly oper-
ated plantations, the state provided interest-free loans to individual households to 
develop private plantations.
State officials, however, never intended for small-holder rubber farmers to 
outperform state farms in rubber production. The central government intended 
rather that state farms would play the dominant role in rubber production with 
supplemental input from smallholders’ plantations beyond state farms (Li 1998). 
The central government similarly never expected to lose direct control over these 
smallholders and their rubber ventures within and beyond China. Notwithstand-
ing these intentions and expectations, the total area of “peoples’ rubber planta-
tions” in Xishuangbanna eventually surpassed that of the state farms in 2004. In 
addition, by the 2000s, nearly all of the “peoples’ rubber plantations” initially 
developed under collective enterprise and jointly operated schemes were privatized 
and distributed among individual households.
Seeing like a state: State efforts to eradicate  
shifting cultivation in Xishuangbanna
A key part of state efforts to transform Xishuangbanna into a rubber-producing 
frontier involved concerted efforts by state officials to eradicate shifting cultivation 
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and relocate highland communities from higher to lower elevations deemed ideal 
for rubber cultivation. State strategies to achieve these intertwined goals went 
through several stages.
First, during the communal period (1958 to the early 1980s) many highland vil-
lages were forcibly relocated from higher to lower slopes. In 1967, Arka village—
the main case study highlighted in this article—was relocated to a lower slope and 
merged with another relocated Akha village to form a “production team” near its 
current location. The villagers were then relocated again to their present location 
in 1971 due to the state’s decision to construct a reservoir at the previous location.
The purpose of these resettlements was to force highlanders to adopt sedentary 
agriculture, particularly irrigated paddy fields. These paddy fields were established 
in the form of either terraces on lower slopes or paddy fields in small yet-to-be-cul-
tivated valleys. Irrigation networks were further established in the form of reser-
voirs and irrigation ditches.
There were limitations, however, on the amount of available land that could be 
converted to paddy fields. As a result, many relocated villages initially continued 
practicing shifting agriculture at higher slopes as a means of subsistence. Never-
theless, the resettlement process effectively established the physical and economic 
basis for villagers’ subsequent development and expansion of rubber plantations. 
Villagers were now situated at slopes ideal for rubber cultivation. They were fur-
ther able to produce more rice per unit of land in irrigated paddy fields than in 
higher slope areas that were now made available for other purposes.
The second major strategy pursued by state officials to eradicate shifting culti-
vation involved the establishment and expansion of state rubber farms, and, later, 
collective and jointly operated “peoples’ rubber plantations” beyond state farms 
as discussed earlier. Importantly, these plantations were largely established on the 
fallow swidden lands of local ethnic minorities via a process of land encroachment 
and dispossession. For example, one of the state’s largest rubber plantations—
Dongfeng State Farm, which was established in 1958—encroached on Arka vil-
lage’s traditional territory and swallowed up its closest and most fertile swidden 
lands. Arka village elders informed Wang that during the 1960s and early 1970s, 
whichever land they had turned to fallow in that area was seized by the state and 
planted with rubber trees.
As a result, Arka villagers were forced to move their swidden agriculture to 
more marginal lands at higher elevations and with deeper degrees of slope. Much 
of these lands, however, were now located some two to three hours by foot, then 
the main means of transportation, from the village’s new location. Later, in the 
early 1980s, the state appropriated more of Arka’s traditional swidden lands to 
establish a collective plantation called Xiaojie Plantation Farm. In addition, from 
1982 to 1984 roughly 300 mu (20 ha) of rubber plantations were developed on 
Arka’s swidden lands as part of a jointly operating “peoples’ rubber plantation” 
established by Arka villagers with assistance from Dongfeng State Farm. In short, 
all of these initiatives greatly reduced the amount of Arka’s swidden lands.
The state’s final grand strategies to eliminate shifting cultivation took shape in 
the domains of policy and law, namely the Household Contract Responsibility Sys-
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tem (HCRS) introduced in the early 1980s, and a 1998 ban on logging and shift-
ing cultivation. Under the HCRS all agrarian households in China were allocated 
certain amounts of land recategorized as “agricultural land.” The HCRS indirectly 
worked to curtail or contain shifting cultivation by constraining it to these very 
limited areas of land recategorized as agricultural lands.
According to the HCRS, as instituted in Xishuangbanna in the early 1980s, the 
total amount of land allocated for swidden agriculture was 1,447,800 mu (96,520 
hectares), comprising just 5 percent of the total land area (Xishuangbanna Forestry 
Bureau 2000). In 1982, the total population of non-Han and non-Dai minori-
ties in Xishuangbanna was 245,946 people. If we assume that 90 percent of these 
minorities were practicing swidden agriculture in the highlands, then the average 
size of allocated swidden lands was 6.5 mu (.43 ha) per capita, which is far less than 
the amount required to maintain a healthy rotation of swidden agriculture.8 In 
addition, these lands were far from evenly distributed among and within villages. 
As expected, most villagers at this time lacked access to adequate land for shifting 
cultivation and responded by gradually transitioning to various cash crops, such as 
rubber, to make ends meet.
In the case of Arka village, the transition from swidden rice to more sedentary 
cash-crops, especially rubber, occurred primarily in response to the implementa-
tion of the HCRS, long before the 1998 logging ban.9 In 1983, each Arka villager 
was allocated 11 mu (.73 ha) of swidden lands according to the HCRS. This land 
was dispersed in four plots, which were allowed for rice cultivation with a rota-
tional period of six years. This only allowed for five fallow years, however, which is 
not a healthy rotational period and thus unsustainable. As a result, Arka villagers 
were compelled to find alternatives to shifting cultivation. The villagers largely 
found these alternatives in rubber, which they gradually, albeit reluctantly, adopted 
with early assistance from the same state farm that had earlier encroached on much 
of their most cherished swidden lands.
Negotiating rubber frontiers in Arka village
As mentioned earlier, the first rubber plantation in Arka village was a collective 
one developed at Bano in the early 1980s under the government’s joint-operation 
scheme and with assistance from Dongfeng State Farm.10 Later, in 1985 and 1986 
the state encouraged individual households in Arka to grow privately owned rub-
ber trees on a small plot of redistributed collective land (see figure 1). This initial 
attempt to encourage private rubber planting, however, was not very successful for 
several reasons. First, the villagers lacked confidence in what was for them a new 
crop. Second, they had not yet acquired technical expertise in rubber cultivation. 
Last, the plot they received for planting was too small to be given enough input.
It wasn’t until the late 1980s that the villagers first began to earnestly develop 
private rubber plantations due to two factors. First, they had exhausted their first 
cycle of swidden lands, and their prior fallow lands were not yet ready for a second 
crop of rice. Second, the villagers had started tapping the rubber trees in their pio-
neer collective plantation and were seeing the potential profits from rubber. This 
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particular wave of plantation development lasted the longest (1987–1992) as most 
households needed time to acquire the technical skills and financial resources nec-
essary to develop their own plantations.
The second wave of rubber plantation development in Arka occurred between 
1993 and 1995 in another area of collective lands referred to as Gawjaw. Gaw-
jaw was initially a protected communal forest that the state later designated as a 
fengjing lin or “scenic forest” in the early 1980s. In 1993, however, the villagers 
collectively cleared the forest, and individual households received land plots to cul-
tivate rubber. It took the villagers until 1996, however, to acquire enough financial 
resources to begin earnestly planting rubber trees on these lands. It was in 1996 
that villagers first began tapping their privately owned rubber plantations.
In 1999, the villagers used the cash income from their private plantations to 
plant rubber trees on a third plot of former swidden lands that was cleared prior 
to the 1998 logging ban. This period of planting, however, was interrupted by the 
logging ban, which was enforced in 2000, and then continued under the Land 
Conversion Project in 2001 and 2002, although none of Arka’s rubber plantations 
were subsidized by that project.
With increasing capital from their earlier established plantations, villagers were 
able to quickly plant rubber trees on a fourth plot of prior swidden lands from 
2003 to 2004. As a result, all of the village’s swidden lands were planted with 
rubber trees by 2004. Later, in 2005, the first collective rubber plantation at Bano 
was cleared and its land was distributed among individual households that quickly 
went about replanting rubber trees on their now privately owned lands.
The final wave of rubber plantation development in Arka occurred in 2006 at a 
site called Bada. Bada was traditionally a part of Arka’s swidden lands. In the early 
1980s, however, the state declared Bada a “state forest.” Later, however, a neigh-
Figure 1. Smallholders’ rubber plantations in Arka.
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boring Dai village applied for state permission to use Bada for rubber cultivation, 
claiming that they had far fewer rubber holdings when compared to other local vil-
lages. In order to prevent this from happening, however, Arka’s village leaders sub-
mitted a counter-request to claim Bada, asserting that Bada was their traditional 
swidden land. In order to avoid any unwanted inter-village and ethnic conflicts 
over land, the local government approved both of the applications and split the 
total land area between the two villages.
Everyday forms of peasant resistance?
During fieldwork we learned that many of the local farmers in Arka and beyond 
engage in a range of everyday practices via which they strive to not merely evade 
the state (Scott 1985) but also engage the state and, to a certain degree, see and 
act like the state in ways that afford them some autonomy over their lands and 
livelihoods, albeit by working within and around newly imposed state regimes of 
regulation and control (Scott 1998; Trouillot 2001, 132; Chatterjee 2004; Appa-
durai 2013; Krupa and Nugent 2015). The three areas we discuss in the following 
paragraphs focus on the varied agencies of villagers in response to state initiatives 
to reshape agrarian landscapes and communities in a more “legible,” “controlla-
ble,” and “taxable” fashion.
First, since 1999 the central government had worked to curb the “uncontrolled” 
development of private rubber plantations, partly due to rising environmental con-
cerns. Local officials, however, largely failed to prevent villagers from expanding 
their private plantations on not only their own contracted lands but also on state 
“forests” or “wastelands.” Collectively, villagers were generally effective in employ-
ing various state discourses to justify their applications for permission to cultivate 
rubber on state-appropriated lands. This was the case of Bada, as mentioned. Indi-
vidual households were also able to use their personal connections or guanxi with 
local officials to obtain permission to grow rubber in state forests.
Many other villagers, however, circumvented the local authorities altogether 
and, in the eyes of the state, “encroached” on “state forests” in expanding their 
rubber holdings. In the case of Arka, since nearly all of the village’s cultivable lands 
were planted with rubber trees by 2006, any household wanting to expand its 
rubber holdings had to do so on state-appropriated lands, whether licitly or illic-
itly. Ironically, rubber trees, a new crop that the state intentionally employed to 
consolidate control over local resources and people, were eventually used by those 
local actors to maintain some autonomy from the state.
Second, Arka villagers engaged in outright acts of “theft” from the state farms 
and their workers until the mid-1990s. Akha and other indigenous communities 
generally disliked the state farms in their early stages of development as they had 
encroached on and appropriated large amounts of their Ancestral lands. In retalia-
tion, villagers often stole various items, especially chickens, vegetables, and rubber 
from the state farms, leading to conflicts with state farmers that occasionally led 
to violence. These acts of theft subsided in the late 1990s as local rubber farmers 
began tapping their rubber trees for the first time. Prior to that time, the local 
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farmers were struggling to survive and pay for rising costs of food, education, and 
healthcare.
Another area of state-society praxis that is more akin to state evasion is that of 
the general tendency for local farmers in Xishuangbanna to underreport their rub-
ber holdings and profits as well as their profits from other economic activities to 
the local government (and scholars such as ourselves) in order to reduce or avoid 
real or potential state taxation. For example, in 2006 Wang conducted a survey of 
smallholder’s rubber holdings in Arka. The villagers reported a total of 7,180 mu 
(479 ha) of rubber plantations. The village headman later informed Wang, how-
ever, that in actuality the villagers collectively owned at least 10,000 mu (667 ha) 
of rubber plantations. If the village headman is correct, then the villagers underre-
ported their rubber holdings to Wang by about 30 percent. These practices of “state 
evasion” can be seen as “everyday forms of peasant resistance” (Scott 1985, 298).
“Where the rubber meets the road”: Ecological  
and sociocultural impacts of rubber
In the remainder of this article we discuss some of the many sociocultural changes 
that occurred in Arka village in conjunction with the political and economic trans-
formations discussed earlier, namely the heightened presence of the state and a 
transition from shifting agriculture centered on subsistence rice to more sedentary 
agriculture centered on cash-crop rubber. In brief, rubber plantations dramatically 
transformed not only the local ecology but also the entire social fabric of rub-
ber-producing villages in Xishuangbanna.
From rice to rubber
Until the 1980s, Akha livelihoods and Ancestral practices throughout the Upper 
Mekong Region largely centered on the cultivation of upland rice for subsistence. 
As a staple food, rice was, and for some Akha still is, a core crop cultivated in 
upland swiddens. Indeed, when Akha from Arka village in Xishuangbanna first 
began planting rubber trees in the mid-1980s, they intercropped those trees with 
rice on their swiddens. Intercropping in this manner, however, negatively impacted 
their rice harvests, leading the villagers to experience their first food shortage fol-
lowing the implementation of the HCRS in the late 1980s.
As a result, in 1990 and 1991, and with the local government’s approval, the 
villagers decided to clear their remaining communal forests in order to cultivate 
more upland rice. In the long term, however, this failed to produce enough rice. 
A more adequate solution was then found by intensifying rice cultivation in their 
irrigated paddy fields, which, up until that time, had received minimal input and 
labor from the villagers. In the mid-1990s, the villagers began to double-crop their 
paddy fields and adopt high-yielding hybrid rice varieties that further required the 
application of chemical pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers. As a result, swidden 
agriculture along with the colorful, tasty, and nutritional upland rice that it pro-
duced as well as many other traditional crops gradually disappeared. Village elders 
often complained of the poor taste of their newly cultivated hybrid rice varieties.
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In the end, however, the intensified cultivation of rice in irrigated paddy fields 
did not compensate for the villagers’ inadequate production of rice as they contin-
ued to transform their rice swiddens into rubber plantations. In 2006, twenty-two 
out of 109 surveyed households reported that they were no longer able to produce 
enough rice for their own subsistence. Another eighteen households reported that 
they had to either buy or borrow rice for household consumption in 2005.
In earlier times, it would have been very shameful for Akha, as expert rice cul-
tivators, to fail to produce enough rice for their households. In the age of rubber, 
however, this earlier moral economy centered on rice was transformed into one 
centered on rubber and its cash profits, which permitted households to buy not 
only rice but also other newly available goods in local markets. By 2010, the vil-
lagers of Arka had stopped cultivating rice altogether, deciding rather to not only 
concentrate their labor on rubber but also lease their paddy fields to an outside 
Han businessman who converted them into a banana plantation.
From hogs to the hearth: The many uses of rubber trees
Apart from rubber, pig husbandry is currently the second major source of income 
for Arka villagers (see table 1). In 2005, villagers made roughly 75,000 Chinese 
yuan (RMB) from the sale of hogs, which contributed to 3.9 percent of their 
annual household incomes. In that year, the villagers slaughtered another 130 hogs 
for their own household consumption and feasting.11 Recent trends show that pig 
husbandry is becoming an increasingly significant part of the economy in Arka in 
terms of both incomes and also household consumption and feasting.
As a reflection of their pragmatism and resourcefulness, the villagers have found 
a way to connect rubber and hogs. The oil-rich seeds produced annually by rubber 
trees are now the primary fodder for hogs in Arka and surrounding areas. This is 
yet another reason that local farmers now look to rubber trees as their preferred 
cash crop. In 2007 alone, Arka villagers fed a total of 77,160 kg of rubber seeds to 
their hogs, amounting to roughly 46,296 yuan.12 Importantly, rubber seeds are an 
important byproduct of rubber trees that anyone can freely gather. Lastly, rubber 
farmers in Xishuangbanna found two additional uses for rubber trees. First, they 
use the dead branches for firewood in cooking. Second, they sell the hardwood of 
older trees that can no longer be tapped to local timber and furniture industries.
Table 1. Major sources of household income in Arka village in 2005
Income source Rubber Hogs Tea Others* Total
Absolute value (yuan) 1,770,300 75,478 13,040 57,100 1,902,878
Percent of total income 92.4% 3.9% 0.7% 3.0% 100%
*Note: Other cash incomes were derived from wage labor, small business ventures, and the sale of 
medicinal plants (i.e., Amomum) and bamboo handicrafts.
Of rubber and sacred forests: “Money can make ghosts turn millstones”
During the Mao era, the state overtly suppressed many of the Ancestral practices 
of Akha and other ethnic minorities in Xishuangbanna. These state-sponsored acts 
of religio-cultural suppression extended to Akha religio-cultural ecologies, accord-
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ing to which certain forests were designated as sacred (in Akha yawhawr) and thus 
taboo to encroach on. Akha generally believed that those who dared to encroach 
on these sacred sites would bring upon themselves and their households the wrath 
of the “invisible spirits” or naevq dwelling therein.
In spite of this suppression, however, some of these sacred sites were preserved 
as such until the arrival of the rubber boom in the 1980s. Since that time, many 
Akha villagers in the region, especially younger generations, have encroached on 
these sacred forests, clearing them to expand their rubber holdings. When we 
asked younger villagers in Arka why they dared to encroach on these sacred lands, 
they told us that, unlike the older generations, they do not believe in naevq.
These younger generations believe rather that “money is all-powerful,” in line 
with the popular Chinese idiom qian neng shi gui tui mo, literally meaning “money 
can make ghosts turn millstones.” In spite of these beliefs in the omnipotence of 
money, however, there were several cases where individuals or households that 
dared to encroach on sacred forests experienced an unexplained illness or calamity 
shortly thereafter. In contrast to younger generations, elders generally attribute 
these misfortunes to the wrath of the angry naevq whose sanctity was violated.
Rubber’s ecological impacts
Amid their dramatic transition to a rubber-based economy, Arka villagers managed 
to preserve about 3000 mu (200 ha) of communal forests in a mountainous area 
located adjacent to state forests. Although these lands were once cleared for swid-
den rice cultivation in 1990 and 1991 in response to a food shortage, the forests 
have since been allowed to fully regenerate. In spite of their constant efforts to 
encroach on state forests, not a single villager ever encroached on these communal 
forests without first gaining permission to do so from the village authorities.
When asked about their willingness to encroach on “state forests,” villagers 
informed us that these so-called “state forests” were actually “our forests for many 
generations before the state came and claimed them” in the early 1980s. From this 
perspective, they were simply using land that was rightfully theirs to begin with. In 
a similar vein, the villagers stressed that they were able to preserve what remained of 
their communal forests as these remained under their direct control and ownership.
According to the villagers, many local plant species can still be found in these 
communal forests. Yet the forests are not only fragmented, like small islands of 
biodiversity in a sea of rubber plantations, but also too small to adequately support 
any large animals. Thus, nearly all large animals and many birds have disappeared 
from the forests surrounding Arka village, which are now monoculture rubber 
plantations.
The application of chemical pesticides and herbicides in rubber plantations has 
also killed many of the fish and crabs in local streams. Some local fish species, espe-
cially larger ones, such as ngaqbawlaw (in Akha), completely disappeared. In addi-
tion, many important and highly cherished traditional non-timber forest products 
(NTFPs), such as bamboo shoots, bamboo worms, and mushrooms, are becoming 
increasingly difficult to find in the transformed rubber-scapes surrounding the vil-
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lage. Swidden crop biodiversity was also greatly diminished as a direct result of the 
village’s transition to a rubber-based economy.
On a positive note, the dramatic loss of local forests and resources has encour-
aged many Arka villagers to preserve a number of important and highly cherished 
plants in their home gardens. At present, 170 different plant species can be found 
in these home gardens, of which nearly half were introduced from local forests. If 
managed correctly, these home gardens might offer an effective means of conserv-
ing these plants ex situ.
Cashing in on rubber: Unprecedented wealth and social stratification
Rubber plantations along with the region’s rubber boom brought unprecedented 
cash incomes into Arka and other rubber-producing villages in the region. This is 
the primary reason that villagers in the region now look to rubber trees as their 
preferred cash crop. Between the early 1990s and 2005, reported per capita annual 
income from rubber in Arka rose from just a few hundred yuan to 3,801 yuan. In 
2005, rubber contributed to roughly 92.4 percent of total cash incomes in Arka. 
In actuality, however, these figures were probably higher as the villagers tended 
to underreport their rubber incomes. According to the village head, in 2006 per 
capita rubber income rose to 6,000 yuan.
These increases in cash income, however, are unevenly distributed among 
households. For example, in 2005, 83.5 percent of the households in Arka (91 out 
of 109) earned less than 30,000 yuan. Another 15.6 percent of the households (17 
out of 109) earned between 30,000 and 50,000 yuan. Finally, just one household, 
that of the village head, had a cash income of over 120,000 yuan.
In 2005, the average household income was 17,577 yuan, while the median 
household income was 60,600 yuan. The large difference between the average 
and median household income signifies the uneven distribution of wealth among 
households with respect to rubber holdings and profits, and it indicates rising 
socioeconomic stratification within the village. Earlier studies on Akha rubber 
farmers in Xishuangbanna do not adequately address these intra-village differentia-
tions in terms of rubber holdings and cash income (e.g., Sturgeon 2010).
Two key factors explain the uneven possession of rubber holdings among house-
holds in Arka. First, in spite of official policy in the early 1980s, namely the HCRS, 
calling for equitable land distribution on the basis of household size, in actuality 
households with more political power and connections were able to obtain much 
larger land holdings than less powerful households. In particular, local commune/
village leaders and their relatives manipulated these policies and grabbed much 
larger plots of land than other households in the village, laying the foundation 
for the emergence of a high degree of socioeconomic differentiation under the 
market economy that gradually took shape post-2000. Other studies confirm that 
this pattern of uneven land possession and resource access was found more widely 
throughout the Xishuangbanna highlands following implementation of the HRCS 
in the early 1980s (Sturgeon 2005).
A second factor behind the emergence of these inequities was a result of gov-
ernmental land reforms in the early 1980s. For various reasons, these reforms, 
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which led to the appropriation and distribution of upland areas recategorized as 
either “state forests” or “agricultural land,” excluded large tracts of upland areas 
that were left unidentified, unmanageable, and thus “illegible” from the state’s 
vantage point. In Arka, the new village leadership that emerged in the post-com-
mune period abused its authority and took advantage of these land reform gaps to 
claim these “unidentified” lands as their own private property.
The village leaders further arranged to contract out some of these lands “on 
behalf of the village,” while keeping most of the profits derived from such ventures 
for themselves and their relatives. The leaders and their relatives then used this 
private capital to expand their private rubber holdings. In contrast, most villagers, 
especially the poorest, lacked sufficient capital to develop rubber plantations and 
were compelled to contract out some of their lands, often to the village leadership 
and their relatives, in order to acquire the capital to begin planting rubber trees on 
their remaining lands. All of these factors have further contributed to a rising gap 
between “the haves” and “the have-nots” with respect to rubber holdings and profits.
Rubber, rising standards of living, and new social problems and chronic disease
Increased cash income from rubber has generally helped to raise the standard of 
living for villagers in Arka and other rubber-farming communities in Xishuang-
banna. Villagers’ elevated standard of living can be seen in the new homes spring-
ing up across the countryside, in improved road and telecommunication networks, 
and in new means of transportation, such as motorcycles, and, in some instances, 
cars and trucks. In Arka village, a growing number of households built new vil-
la-style homes within the last decade.
Nearly all households in Arka have acquired several motorcycles in addition to 
a tractor, cable television, and telephone lines. Most, if not all, teenagers and adult 
villagers have mobile phones. In addition, gravity-fed potable water is now piped 
to each household. Rice cultivation is also mechanized. In 2010, however, the vil-
lagers decided to stop cultivating rice altogether and lease their paddy fields to an 
outside Han agribusiness that converted those fields into a banana plantation.
At the same time, however, a rising trend of competitive consumption is devel-
oping in the village. For example, with their increased cash incomes from rubber, 
villagers have either (re)vitalized or initiated various communal celebrations on 
grander and more elaborate scales than in the past. These events include more 
traditional celebrations, such as weddings and new house celebrations, and newly 
invented or borrowed celebrations, such as birthdays, especially those marking 
children’s first and tenth year of life.
Generally speaking, these celebrations are becoming increasingly lavish and 
competitive as villagers now regard them as the most direct and conspicuous way 
for a household to display their relative wealth and status. It is now expected that 
a water buffalo and/or a hog will be slaughtered for these celebrations. In many 
instances, it is further expected that the household will hire a professional com-
pany to video record the event and produce a DVD.
Anywhere from a few hundred to a thousand guests might be invited for these 
celebrations. It is now commonplace for guests to give a “money gift” (gua li in 
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Chinese) to the sponsoring household. The amount of the money gift generally 
ranges from fifty to several hundred yuan. It is held that the more you give, the 
more “face” you gain. Sponsoring households keep a written record of each house-
hold in attendance and the amount of money given. It is expected that money gifts 
will later be repaid in kind when another household hosts a celebration. This new 
custom of giving money gifts, however, is an economic burden for many house-
holds in Arka, especially poorer households.13
While these celebrations can cost upward of tens of thousands of yuan, the cost 
is often compensated by the receipt of money gifts. It is generally believed that 
the more a household spends on these celebratory feasts, the more prestige they 
acquire. The high cost of these feasts, however, means that poorer households tend 
to hold fewer and less elaborate feasts when compared to wealthier households. As 
a result, wealthier households, in comparison to poorer ones, benefit more from 
these revitalized feasting practices and the roles they play in redistributing wealth 
and endowing households with prestige.
In addition, as Arka moved to an economy largely based on cash-crop rub-
ber, the village began to experience a variety of new and emerging chronic health 
problems, such as diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia, that are directly 
and indirectly related to rubber and its profits. Several doctors from local clinics 
informed Wang that, in comparison to a neighboring Akha village, Arka villagers 
tend to exhibit poorer overall health. These doctors attribute Arka villagers’ poorer 
health conditions to their main source of potable water, which, until recently, was 
being contaminated by chemical pesticides and herbicides used in rubber cultiva-
tion on their main watershed. Prior to the early 1990s, the watershed was reserved 
as a communal forest. In contrast, the neighboring village draws its potable water 
directly from preserved state forests that serve as the watershed for a local reser-
voir. In recent years, four deformed infants were born in Arka. These deformities 
might be due to the contaminated water source.
Another potentially negative impact of rubber on public health that has yet to 
be adequately addressed by local officials is the strong and repulsive stench of rub-
ber waste that engulfs the village each night during the rubber tapping season, 
which runs from roughly March through November. This rubber waste originates 
in a nearby rubber factory that opened in 2011 on land leased from Arka under the 
direction of the former headman. Each night the factory releases its rubber waste 
into a small stream that runs adjacent to and just below the village before passing 
several lowland Han and Dai villages. Reflecting their growing dependence on 
rubber, however, some Arka villagers joke that “we can’t sleep at night without the 
smell of rubber,” which they further equate with their livelihoods.
The village’s transition to a rubber economy has further impacted the perceived 
value of a formal education in a negative manner. Local teachers often complain 
that it is becoming increasingly difficult to discipline their students in post-rubber-
boom Xishuangbanna. They partly attribute these difficulties to rubber as villagers 
now tend to perceive of rubber tapping, which requires little or no formal edu-
cation, as more valuable than a formal education. In addition, households that 
continue to value and invest in their children’s higher education are finding that 
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their children, even those that complete a baccalaureate degree, struggle to find 
off-farm work in near and distant urban centers in greater China.
Finally, Arka’s transition to a rubber-based economy has dramatically transformed 
villagers’ lifestyles and overall work ethic. While requiring intensive labor when tap-
ping, rubber cultivation, in comparison to swidden rice cultivation, provides villag-
ers with large amounts of down time during which a growing number of individuals 
are engaging in unhealthy activities, such as gambling, drinking, and conspicuous 
feasting.14 These patterns are more widely observable among younger generations 
of rubber tappers who tend to see little or no value in other forms of household 
production besides rubber farming, which directly translates into cash income.
Some individuals have incurred large debts as a result of their gambling addic-
tions and lost many of their rubber holdings. Rising rates of alcoholism are further 
attributing directly and indirectly to poor health and even deaths in the village. In 
addition, the region’s rubber boom brought with it a rising pattern of prostitution, 
resulting in the spread of new and emerging STDs among local communities. In 
recent years, a respected herbalist from Arka village treated over twenty patients 
with STDs, including HIV/AIDS.
Of rubber, shifting marriage patterns, and cultural revitalizations
In spite of its many downsides, rubber has helped to both elevate the social status 
of Akha in Xishuangbanna and greater China (Sturgeon 2010), and also facilitate 
an Akha cultural (re)vitalization movement (Li 2013; Morton 2013, 2015). The ele-
vated social status of Akha is indicated in the increased ratio and pattern of inter-
marriage between Akha and Han since the 1980s. The general pattern of marriage 
in Akha society is for brides to marry into their husband’s households.
Prior to the 1980s, Akha generally considered a woman’s marriage into a local 
Han household as signifying a move up the social ladder. At that time, the status 
of state farmers, which were predominantly Han, was considered higher than that 
of peasant farmers, such as the Akha. In that time period, five women from Arka 
married into the nearby Han village of state farm workers. In contrast, there was 
not a single case of a Han marrying into Arka.
Since that time, however, the pattern has reversed and intensified as some ten 
Han men and six Han women have married into Arka. The main period of tran-
sition in these trends was the late 1990s when Arka villagers began tapping their 
private rubber trees and cashing in on the regional rubber boom. Since that time, 
not a single Arka villager has married into the nearby state farm. Peasant farmers 
with private rubber holdings are now considered wealthier and of higher status 
than state farmers (Sturgeon 2010).
The unprecedented wealth that Akha are experiencing as a result of their tran-
sition to rubber and the rubber boom is further facilitating a broader effort by 
certain Akha communities in the region to (re)vitalize some of their Ancestral 
practices, such as the “Akha New Year Ancestral Celebration” or Kartanrpar, on 
a grander and more elaborate scale. In addition, in the past few years Arka villag-
ers collectively decided to (re)vitalize a section of communal forest located in the 
main watershed above the village from which they obtain potable water in the 
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intertwined interests of cultural (re)vitalization, public health, ecological sustain-
ability, and economic development. These cultural (re)vitalization efforts can in 
part be seen as part of a global shift from “cultural survival” to “survival through 
culture,” a process entailing the incorporation of ethnicity that, while essentializ-
ing, can potentially empower communities as they creatively rework their cultural 
heritages (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009, 24).
Improved living standards are also freeing many Akha women from their prior 
responsibilities to gather water and firewood, thus allowing them more time to 
focus on making modern-traditional-style Akha clothes for their (re)vitalized com-
munal celebrations. A growing number of women in Arka are also (re)vitalizing 
earlier practices of hand-weaving cotton cloth. In 2005, Arka women wove 247 
yar of cotton cloth.15
Rubber’s vulnerabilities: Environmental, climatic, and market factors
Rubber has brought both unprecedented wealth and also new vulnerabilities to 
local rubber farmers in Xishuangbanna as they shifted their livelihoods from swid-
den rice cultivation to more sedentary monoculture rubber plantations. First and 
foremost, rubber trees are highly vulnerable to climate change, pests, and disease. 
For example, many rubber trees in Xishuangbanna died in 1973–1974 and 1975–
1976, when the winter temperature dropped just a few degrees lower than average 
(Cold Injury Investigation Office of Agricultural Reclamation Bureau of Yunnan 
Province 2005).
In addition, pests and disease can not only kill rubber trees but also jeopardize 
rubber production. For example, in early 2008 all of Xishuangbanna’s rubber trees 
were infected by powdery mildew. It was estimated that this particular infection 
decreased local rubber production by 15,000 tons of dry rubber, amounting to a 
loss of over 300 million yuan (Dai 2008). In that year, Arka villagers reported a 
loss of 1.3 million yuan due to the infection.
In addition, the market price of dried rubber tends to fluctuate dramatically. 
For example, for a few days in May 2008 the price soared to 26 yuan/kg and 
thereafter rapidly dropped to just 7 yuan/kg for the remainder of the year.16 That 
dramatic slump can be partially attributed to the 2008 Wall Street crisis, which 
negatively affected global rubber prices. After accounting for their income loss due 
to the powdery mildew infection, in 2008 Arka villagers lost roughly one-third of 
their prior year’s income due to the global economic depression.
More importantly, however, Arka villagers are generally not yet fully aware of 
just how vulnerable they are as a result of their growing economic dependence 
on the monoculture of rubber trees. Based on a 2008 survey, Wang found that 
most villagers did not see a connection between the rise of the powdery mildew 
infection and the large-scale monoculture of rubber trees. Only three of thirty 
survey respondents connected the infection to the dramatic loss of local forests 
and worried that with time the epidemic would only get worse. The majority of 
respondents, however, attributed the infection to either climate change or the use 
of inadequate or “fake” pesticides to control the epidemic. A few villagers even 
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believed that the infection was part of a malicious biological attack on China by 
the West in order to disrupt the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing.
When asked what they might do if another epidemic occurred the following 
year, most of the respondents replied that they were unsure what they would do 
and simply hoped that it would not happen again. Many believed that the local 
government would take some measure to prevent the epidemic from happening 
again as “the state farms have many more rubber plantations than us.” These com-
ments reveal that local farmers are not yet aware of the fact that collectively they 
now have more rubber holdings than the state. Some villagers suggested that if the 
epidemic happened again, they would search for non-farming work in towns and 
cities. Finally, two households noted that they would try and make up for their 
rubber losses by focusing on other forms of household production, such as pig 
husbandry.
Conclusions
Rubber was a key technology via which the modern Chinese state sought to con-
solidate control over what were apperceived as “primitive,” “unproductive,” and 
“illegible” land and people in its southwestern borderlands. In this article, we 
examined this grand project of the state from below, via the lenses of certain Akha 
communities in post-1980s Yunnan, China, that experienced a dramatic shift in 
their livelihoods from shifting to more sedentary agriculture—from subsistence 
rice to cash-crop rubber—in response to the heightened local presence of the cen-
tral Chinese state. We argued that this livelihood shift, while initially a largely pas-
sive response on the part of Akha to the state, was, at later times, more actively 
driven by Akha from below as they sought to maintain some autonomy from the 
state by working within and around a range of newly imposed state regimes of 
regulation and control.
This particular case is a fairly predictable outcome of broader sets of processes 
occurring in other resource frontiers in Asia and beyond as a part of the last great 
state enclosure (Tsing 2005; Scott 2009; Peluso and Lund 2011; Li 2014). A key 
dynamic of these changes is the rapid growth and expansion of boom crops, includ-
ing rubber (Hall, Hirsch, and Li 2011). At the same time, however, the Akha case 
brings attention to the fact that resource frontiers, not unlike borders as described 
by Koff (2013, 11), are complex and dynamic spaces where one often encounters a 
diversity of distinct actors, objects, and practices at play that actively affect larger 
political systems and projects.
In this vein, we highlighted the agencies of local Akha actors in shaping and 
reshaping new and emerging rubber/resource frontiers in a manner that vari-
ably affords them some autonomy while entangling them in new forms of state-, 
market-, and climate-driven controls and vulnerabilities (Chatterjee 2004; Appa-
durai 2013; Krupa and Nugent 2015). We also examined the impacts of these 
political and economic transformations, namely the heightened presence of the 
state and a shift from subsistence rice to cash-crop rubber, on local ecologies and 
the sociocultural life-worlds of peasant rubber farmers in southwest China. In 
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conclusion, this particular case generally supports the argument that in places, 
such as southwest China, where the state provides some “land rights and support 
services” to smallholders, “rubber cultivation is viable and profitable” (Fox and 
Castella 2013, 157), even as it tends to bring about new and emerging forms of 
external control and vulnerabilities.
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Notes
1. We intentionally capitalize the term “Ancestral” throughout the article in order to accord 
the term dignity and recognition as a proper noun.
2. Arka is an anonymous name for the village.
3. Rubber tree cultivation is generally not recommended on slopes higher than 800 meters 
above sea level, although in practice rubber trees are planted on slopes up to 1,000 meters 
above sea level. On a side note, the central government promoted tea plantations as the main 
alternative to swidden agriculture at slopes higher than 1,000 meters above sea level in Xish-
uangbanna.
4. These population statistics are taken from China’s first, third, and sixth national censuses as 
well as a report issued by the Yunnan Provincial Government (1990).
5. In China, Akha are officially identified as a branch of the Hani Ethno-Nationality.
6. In 1950, the US and its capitalist allies embargoed rubber to China as a direct result of Chi-
nese involvement in the American-Korean War.
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7. At this time the state also took control over a number of private rubber plantations that 
were established earlier between 1904 and 1950 by certain local elite.
8. In Xishuangbanna, the minimum amount of land required for a healthy swidden rotation is 
roughly 15 mu (1 ha) per capita. 3 mu per capita is generally required to produce enough food 
annually, and 15 mu of land can be divided into five plots. If each plot is cultivated for two 
years, 15 mu of land permits a rotation of ten years with eight fallow years.
9. In other parts of Xishuangbanna with more abundant highland areas, shifting cultivation 
continued until the 1998 logging ban, after which swidden lands were converted to cash-crop 
plantations, such as tea, with state subsidies via the Land Conversion Program (2001–2002).
10. This pioneer collective plantation was later replanted in 2005.
11. If 800 yuan is used as the average price of an adult hog, then these 130 hogs would amount 
to roughly 104,000 yuan, comprising 5.4 percent of their total income in 2005.
12. In 2007, the market price of rubber seeds was 0.6 yuan per kilogram.
13. In 2007, Arka villagers spent an estimated 416,000 yuan on “money gifts.”
14. Depending on their work ethic and skill, a couple could tap anywhere from six hundred 
to one thousand rubber trees per day. Tapping is generally started in the late evening and 
completed by the early morning. The tide of latex production for rubber trees is greatest from 
2–3 am.
15. Yar is an indigenous Akha unit of length for cloth. One yar of cloth is considered enough 
to make a full outfit for an adult.
16. These are the actual prices at which Arka villagers were able to sell their dried rubber in 
the local market.
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